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IN THEIR RECENT ARTICLE, Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke pro-
pose that in certain circumstances torture is "morally justifiable" and
should be permitted as an "interrogation device" in order to "prevent
significant harm to others."1 Their article is one of a growing number
of scholarly works that have considered the efficacy of torture in such
circumstances. Indeed, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that:
"[a]mong legal academics, a near consensus has emerged: coercive
interrogation must be kept 'illegal,' but nonetheless permitted in cer-
tain circumstances." 2 This body of work has been given added impor-
tance because of the ongoing threats of terrorist attacks in the United
States and elsewhere, as well as growing evidence that as part of the
war on terror," officials within the Bush Administration have sanc-
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1. Mirko Bagaric &Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circum-
stances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 581, 583, 585 (2005).
2. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal? 2 (Univ.
of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 84, 2005). While it is indeed the case
that a consensus is emerging within legal scholarship, there are still significant differences
between individual viewpoints. As a form of shorthand, those who have explored the possi-
ble advantages of a system of coercive interrogation operating within a legal framework of
exceptions shall, for the purpose of this Article, be termed "proponents." This is for ease of
reference and is not intended to imply that this group of scholars thinks torture or other
ill-treatment is a generally favorable thing. Many, such as Alan Dershowitz, have made clear
their general opposition to the use of torture. See also infra note 35 and accompanying text;
Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. Scrt. L.
Rav. 275, 275-76 (2004) ("I am generally against torture as a normative matter, and I would
like to see its use minimized.").
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tioned the use of coercive techniques against detainees.3 There is also
convincing evidence that detainees in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guant,-
namo Bay have been subjected to physical and psychological abuse. 4
According to reports, some terrorist suspects have been sent to other
countries, such as Syria and Egypt, for interrogation, where they have
been subjected to torture and other abuses by authorities with a long
history of such practices. 5
This Article will consider a key issue: does coercive interroga-
tion,6 as Bagaric and Clarke suggest, work in producing timely, relia-
ble, life-saving information? Thus far, much of the scholarly discussion
in this area has been concerned with the procedural, legal, and philo-
sophical issues raised by coercive interrogation. Only very limited at-
tention has been given to the issue of effectiveness. The proponents of
a legally-sanctioned system of coercive interrogation appear, without
detailed analysis, to be convinced that it is effective. Bagaric and
Clarke claim, "The main benefit of torture is that it is an excellent
3. For primary documents detailing interrogation techniques authorized by the
Bush Administration, see generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAuB
(KarenJ. Greenberg &Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
4. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE AND SECRET DETENTION: TESTIMONY OF "DISAP-
PEARED" IN THE "WAR ON TERROR" (2005) [hereinafter SECRET DETENTION]; PHYSICIANS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE BY US
FORCES (2005); see also infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
5. For a detailed discussion of so-called "extraordinary rendition," see COMM. ON
INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CENTER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, TORTURE BY PROXY. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICA-
BLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" (2004).
6. While reference is made to "torture" in many of the sources cited within this Arti-
cle, the author will wherever possible refer to "coercive interrogation." This term includes
not only the most serious forms of coercion that involve the infliction of extreme physical
and psychological suffering, but also those techniques that do not reach the "torture"
threshold, but which still may have a debilitating impact upon the well-being of those who
are subjected to such methods. This approach is based on Article 3 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which distinguishes between torture and "inhumane and de-
grading" treatment. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 3 states: "No one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. The jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights provides that torture is defined as "deliberate
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering" and that the distinction be-
tween torture and inhumane or degrading treatment rests upon the "intensity of the suf-
fering inflicted." Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 79, para. 167 (1978). In
more recent cases the court has also stated that:
ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope
of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the
circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its
duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some circumstances, the sex, age
and state of health of the victim.
A. v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611, 629, para. 20 (1999).
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means of gathering information. '7 In their analysis of the possible
drawbacks and benefits of coercive interrogation, Posner and
Vermeule cite evidence that "strongly suggests that coercive interroga-
tion saves lives."8 Likewise, Dershowitz claims that torture "sometimes
works, even if it does not always work" and that "there are numerous
instances in which torture has produced self-proving, truthful infor-
mation that was necessary to prevent harm to civilians." 9 Other schol-
ars have given support to the idea of legally-sanctioned torture with
little concern as to whether it is effective. 10
It is apparent that the assessment of evidence given by the propo-
nents of a legally-sanctioned system of coercive interrogation is lim-
ited. While there are undoubtedly examples of coercion gaining life-
saving information, this Article questions whether such techniques
can be considered generally effective. Since the effectiveness of coer-
cive interrogation must be central to any argument for a legally-sanc-
tioned system of coercion, it is a matter that cannot be overlooked.
Such an analysis also raises further doubts regarding Bagaric and
Clarke's claim that a moral justification for the use of such techniques
exists.
In deciding whether coercive interrogation works, this Article de-
velops an analytical framework with which to judge the issues. Given
the complex legal and moral questions raised by coercive methods,
claims of effectiveness cannot rest merely upon assumptions that these
methods will work most of the time, or even sometimes. Rather, there
must be an examination of evidence and a recognition of the impor-
tance of this evidence in any decision to overturn current legal
prohibitions on the use of torture and other illegal methods. The two
parts of the analytical framework considered in this Article are reliabil-
ity and predictability. These variables emphasize important elements in
determining the effectiveness of coercive techniques. Reliability is of
fundamental importance to the debate over coercive interrogation."
7. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 588-89.
8. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 13.
9. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RE-
SPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 137 (2002) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING].
10. See, e.g., Andrew A. Moher, The Lesser of Two Evils? An Argument forJudicially Sanc-
tioned Torture in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 469 (2004).
11. Strauss has put forward an argument that reliability may not be a central concern
in the context of coercive interrogation:
[T]orture need not always be effective to be justified. First, it is important to re-
member that torture is not being advocated for purposes of obtaining evidence to
prosecute someone. In that case, the reliability of information would be para-
mount. But here, the information is being sought in order to further investigate
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If coercion is unreliable, then it is unlikely that it will produce the
timely and accurate information that is sought. Such methods may
lead to cooperation, but are they a reliable means of obtaining truth-
ful information? Predictability has a widely recognized role in the devel-
opment and application of legal rules. It enhances decision making
and assists in the assessment of risk. The notion of predictability may
also apply to the development of tools for the investigation and en-
forcement of the law. In the context of coercive interrogation, predict-
ability is important when deciding whether and when coercion is
likely to produce reliable information and what types of interrogation
techniques might be utilized in order to achieve that goal.
In their recent work on coercive interrogation, Posner and
Vermeule argue that "there is no philosophical justification for think-
ing that coercive interrogation should be considered special, and reg-
ulated differently than the other serious, coercive harms that
government inflicts."'12 In so doing, the authors make specific refer-
ence to the legal regulation of the use of "deadly force" by police of-
ficers and suggest that similar legal mechanisms could apply to the use
of coercive interrogation. 13 Similarly, Bagaric and Clarke state:
Ultimately, torture is simply the sharp end of conduct whereby the
interests of one agent are sacrificed for the greater good. As a com-
munity, we are willing to accept this principle. Thus, although dif-
fering in degree, torture is no different in nature from conduct
that we sanction in other circumstances.
1 4
and to try to prevent future terrorist attacks. While, undoubtedly, there is ample
evidence that torture frequently yields false confessions, this concern is less signif-
icant when the purpose of an interrogation is to obtain information and not to
secure a conviction. When torture is utilized for informational purposes only, the
dangers of false information are the risks of wasted time and resources. The possi-
bility of even a germ of truth coming from the mouth of an otherwise silent con-
spirator, conceivably, might be worth the risk.
Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 263 (2004) (citation omitted). In the
current debate, the most prominent scenario in which it is argued that coercion might be
appropriate is in the context of a terrorist who refuses to disclose the whereabouts of a
"ticking bomb." In such circumstances, the disclosure of timely, reliable information is
essential. The claim that the "dangers of false information" only involve "wasted time and
resources" fails to recognize the purpose of intelligence gathering. False information may
also have untold consequences in terms of the prevention of future terrorist attacks, as well
as for those who may be implicated in acts of terrorism, resulting from false accusations.
This latter problem was in evidence during the French use of torture in Algiers. Darius
Rejali, Does Torture Work?, SALON.COM, June 21, 2004, available at http://www.salon.com/
opinion/feature/2004/06/21/torturealgiers/indexnp.html. This has also been alleged
by former detainees of Guant~namo Bay. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
12. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 4.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 584.
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In principle, these are strong arguments-why completely outlaw co-
ercive interrogation when the law currently allows state officials, such
as police officers, to inflict greater harm in certain defined circum-
stances? Clearly, on an abstract philosophical level, using a particular
set of assumptions, one can establish a case for regulating coercion,
just like other harms inflicted by state officials. To be convincing, how-
ever, such arguments have to be rooted in an analysis of evidence,
which helps establish whether or not coercive interrogation is indeed
"no different in nature from conduct that we sanction in other cir-
cumstances." 15 In the context of whether or not coercion is effective
as compared with other forms of regulated conduct, Bagaric and
Clarke fail to engage in such an analysis.
Taking the example of deadly force used by Posner and
Vermeule, there are specific issues of reliability and predictability that
are of central importance to this discussion. First, shooting dead an
armed suspect who is threatening police officers or innocent bystand-
ers is a highly effective way of neutralizing a clear and imminent
threat. Assuming the officers are competent and hit their intended
target, then the risk to innocents, such as being shot in any crossfire, is
minimized. In this respect, the decision to shoot an armed suspect can
be said to have reliable and predictable consequences.
By contrast, where coercive interrogation is used in circumstances
suggested by Posner, Vermeule, Bagaric, and Clarke, to prevent an
imminent catastrophe, the situation is less clear. First, unlike the case
of the gun-wielding criminal, the authorities may not be entirely cer-
tain as to whether the detainee is a guilty party in the sense of either
being a terrorist or someone in possession of relevant life-saving infor-
mation. Second, unlike the use of deadly force in the scenario de-
scribed, the use of coercive interrogation is a much less reliable means
of achieving the intended goal of gaining timely, truthful information.
There are widely recognized problems of coercive interrogation pro-
ducing "bad information."16 Indeed, one of the ironies of the entire
debate surrounding coercive interrogation is that its use in the con-
text of the paradigmatic "ticking bomb" terrorist may also be where it
is of the least utility. Where a decision to use coercion is made in
order to avoid an imminent catastrophe, the suspect, assuming he or
she possesses relevant knowledge and is prepared to divulge informa-
tion, could easily give false or misleading information simply to stop
15. Id.
16. For discussion, see infra Parts LB-C and accompanying text.
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the infliction of pain. Once found to be false, there may be little time
for the authorities to gain truthful information.
If this analysis is accurate, then the distinction between deadly
force and coercive interrogation lies in their effectiveness. Neverthe-
less, one has to also recognize that in the real world there are
problems associated with the use of deadly force. The police make
mistakes, and in some police departments, officers do not always act
with appropriate judgment or restraint. 17 It could be argued, there-
fore, that the use of deadly force is problematic and, like coercive in-
terrogation, may involve the targeting of innocents or may not
prevent harmful actions by suspects. This then raises the question-
why outlaw one and not the other?' 8 An alternative way of looking at
this might be to question whether it is wise to empower the state with
the further authority to inflict harm during the interrogation process
when the problem of effectiveness, as will become apparent, is so
widely recognized. If, as Posner, Vermeule, Bagaric, and Clarke claim,
the authorized use of coercion would only take place in rare circum-
stances, 19 then this raises the question as to whether it is worth risking
the potential negative consequences of its use. In addition, many of
the problems associated with the unauthorized or incompetent ac-
tions of police officers who use deadly force can be addressed by train-
ing and the use of methods that avoid lethal force.20 By contrast, most
of the problems associated with coercive interrogation, even with the
use of highly competent interrogators, are inherent to its use. This is
precisely why the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") warns about the
17. Craig Whitlock & David S. Fallis, County Officers Kill More Often, WASH. POST, July 1,
2001, at Al (featuring a police department in which officers shot and killed a significant
number of unarmed people who had committed no criminal offenses and commenting on
the failure of culpable police officers to be held to account for their actions).
18. A crucial question, beyond the scope of this Article, would be to determine the
extent and degree of the problems associated with lethal force.
19. Bagaric and Clarke describe their "ticking bomb" hypothetical as "not one that
has occurred in the real world." Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 583-84. Posner and
Vermeule point out that "catastrophic scenarios" that might warrant coercive interrogation
are "extremely rare" outside of war. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 11.
20. See Whitlock & Fallis, supra note 17, at Al; NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, USE OF FORCE BY
POLICE: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 30-31(1999) (noting the infrequent use
of firearms, as compared with chemical agents, which were the most common type of force
used by officers). This study also noted the use of firearms where there was no, or only
slight suspect resistance. Id. at 49; INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE USE OF FORCE IN
AMERICA 2001, at ii (2001) (showing data indicating a decrease in the rate of firearm use,
with an increase in the use of chemical agents).
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ineffectiveness of physical coercion in its own interrogation
manuals. 21
Posner and Vermeule rightly point out that both police shootings
and coercive interrogation have potential costs and benefits, 22 and
conclude that while the "net cost-benefit calculus" between the two
might be different, "it is unlikely that the difference is great enough to
justify a complete ban on coercive interrogation alone."23 Posner and
Vermeule also note that, "[i]f coercive interrogation is effective, then
the cost of a bright line rule that bans it in all circumstances is high."
24
This, however, must be balanced with any unintended consequences
of allowing the use of coercive interrogation, a very difficult element
to factor into a cost/benefit model.25 In addition, the cost/benefit
analysis favored by Posner and Vermeule requires consideration of all
relevant factors, including the fundamental point of whether coercive
interrogation is actually effective-an issue to which they pay only lim-
ited attention. A threshold of effectiveness, however defined, should
be a precondition to any legalized system of coercion. It is to this issue
of effectiveness that this Article now turns.
I. An Analysis of Evidence Concerning the Effectiveness of
Coercieve Interrogation
Levinson recently claimed that "we really have no idea how relia-
ble torture is as a way of obtaining information."26 While it is certainly
the case that there are inherent uncertainties in considering the effec-
tiveness of coercive interrogation, it cannot be said that we have "no
idea" as to its reliability. Instead, a discussion of evidence is required
to gain a better understanding of its effectiveness. This Article exam-
ines a number of specific issues raised by this review of evidence. No
single issue can be said to be conclusive, but taken together, one
21. See discussion infra Part I.C.
22. Posner and Vermeule rightly reject the use of "cost" and "benefit" in "the techni-
cal sense" and rather the terms be used to denote "good consequences" and "bad conse-
quences." They also acknowledge that others might disagree with their empirical estimates.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 8 nn.22, 31.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 14.
25. See discussion infra Part II.A.
26. Sanford Levinson, Contemplating Torture, in TORTURE: A READER 33 (Sanford Levin-
son ed., 2004). Strauss makes a similar point: "Evaluating the efficacy of torture requires
information not currently available and perhaps, unknowable." Strauss, supra note 11, at
263.
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could reasonably take the view that a judgment can be made regard-
ing the effectiveness of coercive interrogation.
A. The Evidence of Effectiveness upon Which the Proponents Rely
Bagaric and Clarke rely on only one example in claiming coer-
cion is an "excellent means of gathering information." 27 Their exam-
ple is a case from Germany, where the police, by the threat of physical
coercion, induced a suspect to divulge the location of a child whom
he had kidnapped and then murdered.28 Bagaric and Clarke, as part
of their proposal, also argue for the use of a wide range of coercive
techniques without regard for their effectiveness. They state that
where certain criteria are satisfied, "all forms of harm may be inflicted
on the agents-even if that results in death."29 This raises two
problems. The first problem is that by implication, Bagaric and Clarke
appear to acknowledge the uncertain effectiveness of coercive meth-
ods by permitting officials to use "all forms of harm." The second
problem relates to the effectiveness of the most extreme interrogation
methods; coercion that "results in death" has clearly failed. By failing
to engage with the literature, Bagaric and Clarke do not take account
of evidence that shows that the infliction of lethal force, used as a
means of securing cooperation, has a decidedly mixed history in terms
of getting results.30
Despite claiming that there are "numerous" instances of success-
ful coercive interrogation in WHY TERRORISM WORKS, Dershowitz cites
only three examples, all of which are problematic. It is unclear what
definitive role, if any, coercion played in each example. In the first
example, Dershowitz states that "Jordan apparently broke the most
notorious terrorist of the 1980s, Abu Nidal, by threatening his
27. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 588.
28. Id. at 589.
29. Id. at 611. Some proponents of coercive interrogation are much more specific on
the methods to be used. Dershowitz refers to "nonlethal" torture and mentions the use of a
sterilized needle inserted under a suspect's fingernails. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at
148-49.
30. See, e.g., Jean Maria Arrigo, A Consequentialist Argument Against Torture Interro-
gation of Terrorists (Jan. 30-31, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jscope/arrigo03.htm (last visited on Oct. 8, 2005). This paper
was presented at the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, January 30-31,
2003, in Springfield, Virginia. Id. Part I of the paper, "The Animal Instinct Model of Truth
Telling," discusses two examples of lethal or near-lethal force being used during interroga-
tion, one successful, one a failure. Id. at pt. 1. On a related matter it is interesting to note
that according to a CIA interrogation manual, "The threat of death has often been found
to be worse than useless." KUBARK, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 92 (1963).
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mother. '31 Elsewhere, it has also been claimed that threatening family
members has sometimes resulted in cooperation with interrogators. 3
2
Irrespective of how effective such tactics might be, Dershowitz appears
to oppose them: "Unless we are prepared to impose some limits on
the use of torture or other barbaric tactics that might be of some use
in preventing terrorism, we risk hurtling down a slippery slope into
the abyss of amorality and ultimately tyranny."33
Dershowitz's second example of successful coercive interrogation
involves the following reference: "Philippine Police reportedly helped
crack the 1993 World Trade Center bombings by torturing a sus-
pect."13 4 Yet the source he cites for this claim mentions neither the
Philippines nor the World Trade Center attack.35 Dershowitz's third
and most detailed discussion involves the case of Abdul Hakim Murad,
who in 1995 was also detained and tortured by authorities in the Phil-
ippines and was later extradited to the United States to stand trial for
involvement in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Dersho-
witz, basing his discussion on an article published in the Washington
Post3 6 refers to "the lifesaving information they had beaten out of
him."3 7 McCoy notes that in the use of this example by Dershowitz
and others, certain facts have been omitted,38 perhaps the most im-
portant being that
Manila police got all important information from Murad in the
first few minutes when they seized his laptop with the bomb plot
and evidence that led the FBI [to another terrorist suspect]. Most
31. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 249 n.ll.
32. RALPH McGEHEE, Deadly Deceits 105-06 (1999) (McGehee is a former CIA officer
discussing his experiences of witnessing the interrogation of suspected communist insur-
gents in Thailand. In addition to one instance where a threat to a family member was
successful, McGehee also refers to an incident where the wife of a "leading communist" was
told that if she did not cooperate her child would be shot. Despite this threat, she still
refused to cooperate.).
33. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 146.
34. Id. at 137 nl.
35. Steve Chapman, No Tortured Dilemma, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at A18. Dersho-
witz may be confusing this story with another newspaper story from the Washington Post he
cites in the preceding footnote, which does discuss two interrogations by Philippines au-
thorities. The details provided by the story are limited, making an evaluation of the coer-
cion's effectiveness difficult. Matthew Brzezinski, Bust or Boom, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2001,
at 15.
36. Brzezinski, supra note 35, at 15.
37. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 137.
38. Alfred W. McCoy, Cruel Science: CIA Torture & U.S. Foreign Polity, 19 NEW ENG. J. OF
PUB. POL'Y 209, 239 (2005). While Murad's confession during interrogation led to the ar-
rest of a fellow conspirator in Pakistan, it is clear from the Washington Post story, upon
which Dershowitz relies, that the "most damning information" gleaned by the authorities
in this case, was obtained from a computer. Brzezinski, supra note 35, at 27-28.
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supposed details gained from the sixty-seven days of torture that
followed were, as one Filipino officer testified in New York, police
fabrications that Murad mimed to end the pain.3
9
The length of Murad's torture also has implications for Dershowitz's
reference to torture being used "to prevent an imminent act of terror-
ism."'4 0 It raises a question as to whether coercion is a reliable means
of gathering information in circumstances where time is of the
essence.
4 1
The conclusions that the proponents draw from the evidence
they cite are also of interest. While Dershowitz uses three examples of
alleged successful coercion as evidence that it "sometimes" works,
Bagaric and Clarke claim from just one example that coercion is an
"excellent" technique. Further, unlike Bagaric and Clarke, Dershowitz
acknowledges the limitations of some of the evidence in this area. He
notes a claim that, as a result of an Israeli High Court of Justice deci-
sion declaring that the Israeli security services did not possess lawful
authority for the use of certain coercive interrogation techniques, "at
least one preventable act of terrorism has been allowed to take place."
Yet he states, "Whether this claim is true, false, or somewhere in be-
tween is difficult to assess." 42 One might also point out that in the
context of predictability, it is simply impossible to know whether coer-
cive methods would have succeeded in that instance.
Dershowitz also engages in a form of reverse reasoning to suggest
that coercive interrogation works: "It is precisely because torture
sometimes does work and can sometimes prevent major disasters that
it still exists in many parts of the world and has been totally eliminated
from none."43 Dershowitz makes a leap by simply assuming that tor-
ture exists around the globe for a rational reason, that is, as a means
of preventing terrorism or other criminality. He cites no evidence to
support this claim. Indeed, elsewhere he acknowledges that in coun-
tries such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Philippines "torture-including
39. McCoy, supra note 38, at 239 (citation omitted).
40. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 162. The initial reason for Murad's arrest was for
his alleged connection to a plot to "disrupt" a visit of the Pope who was due to visit the
Philippines six days after Murad's arrest. MARITES DANGUILAN VITUG & GLENDA M. GLORIA,
UNDER THE CRESCENT MOON: REBELLION IN MINDANAO 222-23 (2000).
41. In regards to the plot to disrupt the Pope's visit, discussed by VITUG & GLORIA,
supra note 40, one could conclude that the Pope would have already arrived and left the
Philippines many weeks prior to the disclosure of the "lifesaving information beaten out of
[Murad]." In other words, even if one accepts Dershowitz's interpretation of the facts in
this case, the coercive interrogation failed to produce timely information.
42. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 150.
43. Id. at 138.
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the lethal torture of purely political prisoners-is common and ap-
proved at the highest levels of government. '44 When one examines
evidence regarding torture, it becomes apparent that it is used for a
variety of reasons, including: the victimization of political opponents,
human rights campaigners, and journalists; the general suppression of
dissent; as well as the persecution of cultural, racial, and sexual minor-
ities.45 Judged by this evidence, the notion that torture exists because
it works to "prevent major disasters" is perverse.
Posner and Vermeule use evidence from the Israeli security ser-
vices to support their assertion that the argument that coercive tech-
niques are ineffective "runs aground on the evidence." The Israeli
authorities claim to have prevented ninety planned terrorist attacks by
the use of coercive interrogation. 46 Posner and Vermeule describe this
evidence as "anecdotal or impressionistic," 47 which in itself raises
doubts as to whether they can reasonably argue that such evidence is
also "strong." As with other claims regarding the effectiveness of coer-
cive interrogation, the information is limited and verification is impos-
sible. Indeed, there is a much more fundamental point; we do not
even know if the self-justifying claims made by the Israeli authorities
are in fact true.48 Other issues also raise doubts regarding the effec-
tiveness of coercion within the Israeli context. B'Tselem, an Israeli in-
formation center for human rights, states:
[T] he findings are inconclusive... those who make this argument
have not provided a shred of evidence that physical force is the
only or the most effective means to prevent attacks. It is not
enough to present cases in which the GSS [ (General Security Ser-
vice)], after using force during interrogations, succeeded in
44. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 135 (2003).
45. Human rights reports detailing the use of torture and ill-treatment are too numer-
ous to list. For some recent examples from countries where the United States is also "ren-
dering" terrorist suspects for interrogation, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SYIA: A CULTURE
OPPRESSED-THE TORTURE AND IMPRISONMENT OF SYRIAN KuRDs (2004); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, IN A TIME OF TORTURE: THE ASSAULT ON JUSTICE IN EGYPT'S CRACKDOWN ON HOMO-
SEXUAL CONDUCr (2004); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EGYPr: SECURITY FORCES ABUSE ANTi-WAR
DEMONSTRATORS (2003).
46. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 12-13. In HCJ 5100/94, Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, the Israeli High Court of Justice
referred to two examples of coercive interrogation that the Israeli security forces claimed
had prevented future specific acts of terrorism. Id. at paras. 4-5, translated in 38 I.L.M.
1471, 1473-74 (1999).
47. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 13.
48. This is not a suggestion made lightly, B'Tselem claims that members of the Israeli
security services have exaggerated and committed acts of perjury. B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION
ALLOWING THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE AND MENTAL COERCION IN INTERROGATIONS BY THE
GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE 52-53 (2000) [hereinafter B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION].
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preventing terrorist attacks, because we do not know what the re-
sult would have been had the GSS used other methods instead. 49
B'Tselem also notes an increase in major attacks during the 1990s
against Israelis by Palestinian terrorists. This increase occurred after
the General Security Service ("GSS") was authorized to use more
forceful interrogation methods: "Some will argue, no doubt, that were
it not for the GSS's use of these interrogation methods, many more
persons would have been killed or wounded, but, in the absence of
firm proof, this argument does not prove that torture is the most ef-
fective way to prevent terrorist attacks." 50
A number of senior Israeli officials, including a former GSS direc-
tor, have also criticized the use of physical coercion, claiming that ef-
fective alternatives are available. 5 1 Of course, the availability of viable
alternatives does not in itself mean that coercion is ineffective. Coer-
cive interrogation does, however, raise specific, and some might argue
intractable, problems. In light of the evidence discussed below, which
includes further reference to the Israeli experience, coercive interro-
gation may be significantly less effective than other means of informa-
tion gathering.
B. A Cautionary Note from the Historical Record
Historically, there are numerous anecdotal stories of threats or
violence leading to the disclosure of information from detainees.5 2
This material, some of which is limited in terms of detail, also high-
lights the problem of reliability in the use of coercive interrogation. In
Europe, the use of coercive interrogation has a long history; a number
of European states integrated torture with their criminal justice sys-
tems before later abandoning such techniques. According to John H.
Langbein, the safeguards instituted to protect the innocent "never
proved adequate."53 He also notes a recurrent problem with which we
are faced today, "Against the coercive force of the engines of torture,
no safeguards were ever found that could protect the innocent and
guarantee the truth. The agony of torture created an incentive to
speak, but not necessarily to speak the truth."54 These practices also
49. Id. at 50.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 51.
52. See CHRIS MAcKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS 282-84 (2004); B'TSELEM,
LEGISLATION, supra note 48, at 51-52.
53. John H. Langbein, The Legal History of Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 96-97
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
54. Id
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appear to have been a highly unreliable means of gaining confessions,
whether true or not. Arrigo states:
[E]xamination of court records for 625 cases of torture interroga-
tion in France, from the 1500s through the mid-1700s, showed ap-
proximate rates of error-that is, no confession on the rack, under
repeated drowning, crushing of joints, and the like-in 67% to
95% of cases, depending on the province.5
5
Some historical documents condoning the use of coercive inter-
rogation also recognized its limitations. THE MALLEUS MALEFICARUM,
written in the fifteenth century, described and advocated the use of
torture in order, inter alia, to obtain confessions from suspected
witches. It also provided repeated warnings regarding false confes-
sions that may result from the use of torture.
[If] the Bishop and the Judge are well persuaded that, all circum-
stances considered, the accused is denying the truth, let them tor-
ture him slightly, without shedding blood, bearing in mind that
torture is often fallacious and ineffective. For some are so soft-
hearted and feeble-minded that at the least torture they will con-
fess anything, whether it be true or not. Others are so stubborn
that, however much they are tortured, the truth is not to be had
from them. There are others who, having been tortured before,
are the better able to endure it a second time, since their arms
have been accommodated to the stretchings and twistings involved;
whereas the effect on others is to make them weaker, so that they
can the less easily endure torture .... Therefore there is need for
much prudence in the matter of torture, and the greatest attention
is to be gven to the condition of the person who is to be
tortured. 5
It is worth pointing out that the problems associated with coer-
cive interrogation, which were identified by the authors of THE MAL-
LEUS MALEFICARUM in 1486, have not been adequately recognized by
Bagaric and Clarke, or many other proponents of a legalized system of
55. Arrigo, supra note 30, at 17 (citing LISA SILVERMAN, TORTURED SUBJECTS: PAIN,
TRUTH, AND THE BODY IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 182 (2001)). As a matter of more recent
history Arrigo refers to work by PETER HOFFMANN, HISTORY OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE:
1933-1945, at 519 (1977), who recounts the use of torture by the Gestapo against members
of the German Resistance:
Six months from the start of their investigations the Gestapo still had nothing like
precise knowledge of the resistance movement .... This lack of information and
knowledge is all the more astounding in that Himmler's men employed every
means to extract confessions.... Moreover all forms of torture were used without
hesitation.
Arrigo, supra note 30, at 7-8.
56. HEINRICH KRAMER & JAMES SPRENGER, THE MALLEUS MALEFICARUM OF HEINRICH
KRAMER AND JAMES SPRENGER 243 (Montague Summers trans. & ed., Dover Publications 2d
ed. 1986) (1486); see also id. at 225, 229.
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coercive interrogation. Yet these problems are inherent when using
coercion.
C. A Further Note of Caution from the CIA and FBI
Since the 1950s, the CIA has conducted research and field trials
involving human behavior and psychology. One of the reasons for this
work was to produce methods of gathering information from detain-
ees during interrogation. 57 In 1997, following a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request by the Baltimore Sun newspaper, the CIA released two
manuals, both of which explain the use of physical and psychological
interrogation. The first manual is entitled: KUBARK COUNTERINTEL-
LIGENCE INTERROGATION, JuLY 1963 ("KUBARK manual"). The second
is dated 1983 and is entitled: HUMAN RESOURCE EXPLOITATION TRAIN-
ING MANUAL. 58 The latter manual explicitly refers to the ineffective-
ness of coercion: "Experience indicates that the use of force is not
necessary to gain cooperation of sources. Use of force is a poor tech-
nique, yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection ef-
forts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks the interrogator
wants to hear."5 9 Notwithstanding this assertion, both manuals detail
the use of psychological techniques and physical coercion that can be
used to obtain "needed information from subjects."60
These manuals provide a useful means of assessing the claims of
those who propose a legalized system of coercive interrogation. For
example, to bolster their argument, Bagaric and Clarke state,
"Humans have an intense desire to avoid pain, no matter how short
term, and most will comply with the demands of a torturer to avoid
the pain. Often even the threat of torture alone will evoke coopera-
tion. '6 1 They cite no evidence to support these claims.
The CIA manuals by contrast, emphasize the limitations of coer-
cive methods. The KUBARK manual states, "In fact, most people un-
derestimate their capacity to withstand pain. . . .In general, direct
57. For detailed discussions, see generally McCoy, supra note 38.
58. In terms of structure and wording, a substantial part of the 1983 manual appears
to be based upon the content of the 1963 manual.
59. This warning appears before the manual's introduction, in a "disclaimer" entitled
"Prohibition Against Use of Force." CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HUMAN RESOURCE Ex-
PLOITATION TRAINING MANUAL (1983) [hereinafter HUMAN RESOURCE EXPLOITATION TRAIN-
INC MANUAL], available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/CIA%20
Human%20Res%20Exploit%20A1-GI1.pdf (pt. I); http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSA
EBB/NSAEBB122/CIA%2OHuman%2ORes%20Exploit%20H0-L17.pdf (pt. II).
60. Id. § A-I, at L.A (original all capitalized).
61. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 588-89.
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physical brutality creates only resentment, hostility, and further defi-
ance. ' 62 The manual also notes that there are some people able to
withstand pain to a much greater degree than others. 63 Of particular
relevance to a terrorist with deeply embedded religious or political
beliefs, the manual states, "Persons of considerable moral or intellec-
tual stature often find in pain inflicted by others a confirmation of the
belief that they are in the hands of inferiors, and their resolve not to
submit is strengthened."64 Both manuals emphasize the importance of
creating rapport during interrogations and the need for control, pro-
fessionalism, and patience on the part of interrogators.
6 5
Recent events in Iraq illustrate that the use of extreme physical
brutality, as proposed by Bagaric and Clarke, does not necessarily re-
sult in cooperation. After a series of severe beatings Iraqi Major Gen-
eral Abed Hamed Mowhoush died in United States military custody.6 6
Having initially cooperated with his captors without the use of coer-
cion, it was decided that to gain further information physical coercion
would be used. Prior to his death "a secret CIA-sponsored group of
Iraqi paramilitaries, working with Army interrogators, had beaten
Mowhoush nearly senseless, using fists, a club and a rubber hose. '6 7
These techniques failed to gain further cooperation.6 8
Another issue that relates to the reliability of coercive interroga-
tion is that of accurate recollection. The 1983 CIA manual raises ques-
tions regarding the use of "pressures" and the reliability of
confessions.
Some psychologists feel that the subject's ability to recall and com-
municate information accurately is as impaired as his will to resist.
This objection has some validity but the use of coercive techniques
will rarely confuse a reluctant subject so completely that he does
not know whether his own confession is true or false. ... The clas-
sic cautions apply. The pressures are lifted enough so that the sub-
ject can provide information as accurately as possible. 69
62. KUBARK, supra note 30, at 90-91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 93.
64. Id. at 94. See B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION, supra note 48, at 52, for a possible example
of this phenomenon (referring to the interrogation of a Hamas member by the Israeli
security forces).
65. See Conducting the Questioning, in HuMAN RESOURCES EXPLOITATION TRAINING MAN-
UAL, supra note 59, § I-1.
66. Josh White, Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005,
at A01.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. HuMAN RESOURCE EXPLOITATION TRAINING MANUAL supra note 59, § L-7, pt. B. It is
worth emphasizing the fact that Bagaric and Clarke's proposal is for the use of coercion to
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In addition, the manual discusses that some techniques that induce
"debility," such as "prolonged constraint; prolonged exertion; ex-
tremes of heat, cold or moisture; and deprivation of food or sleep,"
are based on an "assumption... that lowering the subject's physiolog-
ical resistance will lower his psychological capacity for resistance."70 It
further explains, however, that "[p]rolonged constraint or exertion,
sustained deprivation of food or sleep, etc. often become patterns to
which a subject adjusts by becoming more apathetic and withdrawing
into himself.... In this case debility would be counter productive." 71
The KUBARK manual states: "The available evidence suggests that re-
sistance is sapped principally by psychological rather than physical
pressures.'"72
Another problem with coercive interrogation, which raises seri-
ous concerns regarding its reliability, is that of false confessions. The
KUBARK manual makes specific reference to this problem.
Intense pain is quite likely to produce false confessions, concocted
as a means of escaping from distress. A time-consuming delay re-
sults, while investigation is conducted and the admissions are
proven untrue. During this respite the interrogatee can pull him-
self together. He may even use the time to think up new, more
complex "admissions" that will take still longer to disprove.
KUBARK is especially vulnerable to such tactics because the inter-
rogation is conducted for the sake of information and not for po-
lice purposes. 73
Prior to their release from Guant~namo Bay in 2004, three British
detainees falsely admitted, after repeated interrogations, to appearing
in a video with Osama Bin Laden. One of the detainees, Sahfiq Rasul,
gave the following explanation for his false confession:
The reason I did this was because of the previous five or six weeks
of being held in isolation and being taken to interrogation for
hours on end, short shackled and being treated in that way. I was
going out of my mind and didn't know what was going on. I was
desperate for it to end and therefore eventually I just gave in and
admitted to being in the video.74
gain intelligence regarding an imminent catastrophe. This is arguably a more difficult and
complex process than gaining a confession, which may involve only minimal cooperation
by a detainee with his or her captors.
70. Id. § L-3.
71. Id.
72. KuBaRK, supra note 30, at 92.
73. Id. at 94. See B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION, supra note 48, at 52, for an example of a
false confession induced by the Israeli security forces.
74. SHAFIQ RASUL, ASIF IQBAL & RHUHEL AHMED, COMPOSITE STATEMENT: DETENTION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMo BAY, para. 199 (2004) [hereinafter COMPOSITE
STATEMENT].
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Rasul and another British inmate at Guantftnamo Bay, Asif Iqbal,
claim that coercion also resulted in false accusations being made by
some detainees against fellow detainees. 75 These disclosures suggest
that measures short of the severe infliction of pain have the potential
to produce inaccurate information in order to stop the coercion. 76
Similarly, the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel cites a case
from the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court in 2003. In acquitting the defen-
dant, the court expressly doubted the claims of the GSS interrogator
and made the following comments regarding the defendant's alleged
confession:
GSS interrogators have confirmed in their testimonies, and it has
been evidenced in protocols that were recorded, that the accused
reached a state in which he announced to them that he is prepared
to sign anything they wrote, even while at the same time he contin-
ued to emphasize that he had no relation to the accusations attrib-
uted to him, because he loves the State and would never harm it.7 7
Ronald Kessler's account of the CIA's campaign against al Qaeda
raises further doubts regarding the effectiveness of coercive
interrogation.
The CIA fueled [press reports of coercion] hoping to instill fear.
But, while CIA psychologists suggested ways to manipulate the pris-
oners, and prisoners might be deprived of sleep, the CIA had
found that torture was not needed and, in any case, it produced
bad information. Simply offering them tea and sympathy was often
enough to get al Qaeda members to talk.... Most al Qaeda mem-
bers cooperated after a day or two.78
The problem of "bad information" and false confessions may also
damage the investigatory process. In hearings concerning the confir-
mation of Alberto Gonzales as United States Attorney General, Doug-
las A. Johnson, executive director of The Center for Victims of
Torture, claimed that the argument that torture is necessary rests on
"unproven assumptions based on anecdotes from agencies with little
transparency." He goes on:
Well trained interrogators, within the military, the FBI, and the po-
lice have testified that torture does not work, is unreliable and dis-
75. DAVID ROSE, GUANTANAMO: AMERICA'S WAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS 106-07 (2004).
76. The three British detainees have provided detailed accounts of how they suffered
psychologically and physically as a result of coercion that included being exposed to ex-
tremes of temperature, being chained for long periods of time, and the use of stress posi-
tions and dogs to frighten them. COMPOSITE STATEMENT, supra note 74, at paras. 56-280.
77. PUB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., BACK TO A ROUTINE OF TORTURE 86 (2003).
78. RONALD KESSLER, THE CIA AT WAR: INSIDE THE SECRET CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERROR
277 (2003). Given the recent allegations of abuse leveled at United States government
agencies, including the CIA, some skepticism must be expressed regarding the accuracy of
these claims, at least in terms of the absence of physical coercion during interrogation.
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tracting from the hard work of interrogation. Nearly every client at
the Center for Victims of Torture, when subjected to torture, con-
fessed to a crime they did not commit, gave up extraneous infor-
mation, or supplied names of innocent friends or colleagues to
their torturers. It is a great source of shame for our clients, who tell
us they would have said anything their tormentors wanted them to
say in order to get the pain to stop. Such extraneous information
distracts, rather than supports, valid investigations.79
Johnson's reference to the FBI is timely. Documents recently re-
leased under the United States Freedom of Information Act8 ° make it
apparent that the FBI expressed serious reservations regarding the ef-
fectiveness of interrogation techniques used by other agencies at
GuantAnamo Bay. In a released e-mail, an FBI official states:
Of concern, DOD [Department of Defense] interrogators imper-
sonating Supervisory Special Agents of the FBI told a detainee that
[redacted] .... These tactics have produced no intelligence of a
threat neutralization nature to date and CITF believes that tech-
niques have destroyed any chance of prosecuting this detainee. If
this detainee is ever released or his story made public in any way,
DOD interrogators will not be held accountable because these tor-
ture techniques were done [by] the "FBI" interrogators. The FBI
will [be] left holding the bag before the public.8 1
In another e-mail an FBI official notes that the DOD and FBI
techniques differ "drastically" and in meetings with the Department of
Justice, "we often discussed [redacted] techniques and how they were
not effective or producing [intelligence] that was reliable." 82 The FBI
official goes on to say that the DOD
wanted to pursue expeditiously their methods to get "more out of
him" [redacted]. We were given a so called deadline to use our
79. Nomination of the Honorable Alberto . Gonzales, Counsel to President George W Bush, to
Be the Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 9-10 (2005) (testimony of Douglas A. Johnson); see also Matthew de LaPlante, Expert
Interrogator Is Roiled by Army's Prisoner Treatment, SALT LAKE TimB., Aug. 4, 2005, at Al.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 522 (2000).
81. E-mail from [redacted], to Gary Bald, Frankie Battle, Arthur Cummings (Dec. 5,
2003, 09:53 A.M.), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_3977.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2005) (regarding "Impersonating FBI at GTMO").
82. These differences refer to the Department of Defense's use of coercive methods
and the FBI's use of non-coercive methods. E-mail from [redacted], FBI, to T.J, Harring-
ton, FBI (May 10, 2004, 12:26 P.M.), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/re-
leased/t313_31 33.pdf (last visited on Oct, 8, 2005) [hereinafter Harrington e-mail]
(copied to others at the FBI, regarding "Instructions to GTMO interrogators"). In this e-
mail, the FBI official refers to "our methods that are proven (Reed school, etc)." "Reed
School" refers to the so-called "Reed technique" of interview and interrogation that em-
phasises inter alia non-coercive methods and rapport building. See John T. Parry & Welsh
S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. Prrr. L. REv.
743, 754-55 (2005), for a brief discussion.
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traditional methods. Once our timeline [redacted] was up [re-
dacted] took the reigns....
•.. I voiced concerns that the [intelligence] produced was nothing
more than what FBI got using simple investigative techniques .... I
finally voiced my opinion concerning the information. The conver-
sations were somewhat heated [redacted] agreed with me. [re-
dacted] finally admitted the information was the same info the
Bureau obtained. It still did not prevent them from continuing the
"[redacted] methods."83
One further point is worthy of mention in the context of Guantd-
namo Bay. The Bush Administration's view is that the detainees at
GuantAnamo are producing "enormously valuable intelligence."8 4
These claims, however, have been doubted. For example, Lieutenant
Colonel Anthony Christino, who for six months prior to his retire-
ment had regular access to the intelligence coming from Guant~namo
Bay, has argued that its value has been "wildly exaggerated"8 5 and that
the system of interrogation adopted at GuantAnamo provides intelli-
gence that is "inherently unreliable. '86
83. Harrington e-mail, supra note 82. Similarly, Seymour M. Hersh quotes a Pentagon
adviser as stating:
They did it the wrong way ... and took a heavy-handed approach based on coer-
cion, instead of persuasion-which actually has a much better track record. It's
about rage and the need to strike back. It's evil, but it's also stupid. It's not tor-
ture but acts of kindness that lead to concessions. The persuasive approach takes
longer but gets far better results.
SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CR-AIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAo FROM 9/11 TO ABu GHRAI 14 (2004).
84. Martin Bright, Guantanamo Has "Failed to Prevent Terror Attacks," OBSERVER
(London), Oct. 3, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,137
43,1318702,00.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Guantanamo Provides Valua-
ble Intelligence Information (June 12, 2005), available at http://www.dod.gov/releases/
2005/nr20050612-3661.html; Kathleen T. Rhem, Am. Forces Press Serv., DefenseLINK
News: Guantanamo Detainees Still Yielding Valuable Intelligence, http://www.dod.mil/
news/Mar2005/20050304-88.html (quoting Army Brig. Gen. Jay Hood, commander of
Joint Task Force at Guant~namo Bay: "Initially we had a lot to do to learn about the nature
of our detainees. Many of them used aliases; many of them were not forthcoming with us
in describing who they were and what their activities on the battlefield were .... But over
the last couple years, we've gained a great deal of information on them and intelligence
from them.").
85. Bright, supra note 84.
86. ROSE, supra note 75, at 119-20. Recently, a number of retired senior military lead-
ers, including nine former generals, signed a letter criticising the use of coercive tech-
niques as ineffective. In this letter, they make reference to the restrictions on the treatment
of detainees contained in the Army Field Manual and state:
The Manual applies the wisdom and experience gained by military interrogators
in conflicts against both regular and irregular foes. It authorizes techniques that
have proven effective in extracting life-saving information from the most hard-
ened enemy prisoners. It also recognizes that torture and cruel treatment are
ineffective methods, because they induce prisoners to say what their interrogators
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D. The Use of Coercive Interrogation in Algiers and Northern
Ireland
Coercive techniques have also been used during a number of
conflicts between states and terrorist organizations. Two such in-
stances that will be discussed here are Algiers and Northern Ireland.
In Algiers during the 1950s, the French military used coercive interro-
gation to gain intelligence in its bid to crush a rebellion against its
rule. Sanford Levinson quotes a recent review of several books pub-
lished in the New York Review of Books- "Was torture effective? .. .
[T] orture enabled the French to gather information about future ter-
rorist strikes and to destroy the infrastructure of terror in Algiers. '87
The problem here is how one defines effectiveness. Levinson fails to
quote the following text from the same paragraph. "Torture not only
failed to repress the yearning for independence among Algerians, it
increased popular support for the FLN, contributing to the transfor-
mation of a small vanguard into a revolutionary party with mass sup-
port .... Indeed, France's tactics helped the FLN to win over Algerian
moderates . "..."88
Furthermore, there is continuing disagreement as to the effec-
tiveness of the methods used by the French authorities. Recent work
by Darius Rejali paints a very different picture than that suggested by
Shatz. Rather than achieving a military victory against terrorists
through the use of torture, Rejali argues that "the French won by ap-
plying overwhelming force in an extremely constrained space, not by
superior intelligence gathered through torture .... What made the
difference for the French in Algiers was not torture, but the accurate
intelligence obtained through public cooperation and informants."8 9
He also notes:
In fact, no rank-and-file soldier has related a tale of how he person-
ally, through timely interrogation, produced decisive information
want to hear, even if it is not true, while bringing discredit upon the United
States.
Letter from twenty-nine retired military officials to John McCain, United States Senator 2
(Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/etn/pdf/mccain-0722
05.pdf (last visited on Oct. 8, 2005); see also Anne Applebaum, The Torture Myth, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A21.
87. Adam Shatz, The Torture of Algiers, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Nov. 21, 2002, at 53, 57 (book
review).
88. Id. at 57. The Front de Liberation Nationale ("FLN") began as a small under-
ground organization violently opposed to French rule in Algeria. Id. at 57.
89. Both Adam Shatz and Darius Rejali note that the French legal system had great
difficulty controlling the French armed forces and their activities in Algiers. Rejali, supra
note 11; Shatz, supra note 87, at 57.
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that stopped a ticking bomb. "As the pain of the interrogation be-
gan," observed torturer Jean-Pierre Vittori, "they talked abun-
dandy, citing the names of the dead or militants on the run,
indicating locations of old hiding places in which we didn't find
anything but some documents without interest."90
In Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, after an upsurge in vio-
lence by the Irish Republican Army, terrorist suspects were interned
without trial by security forces, and some were subjected to what be-
came known as the "five techniques." As part of so-called "interroga-
tion in depth," the following five techniques were utilized by
interrogators: wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, sleep depri-
vation, and deprivation of food and drink.9 1 In Ireland v. United King-
dom,92 the European Court of Human Rights held that while these
techniques did not violate the European Convention on Human
Rights, Article 3 prohibition on the use of torture, they did amount to
"inhumane and degrading treatment."93 Of particular interest to this
Article is the following passage from the court's judgment: "The ...
interrogation in depth by means of the five techniques led to the ob-
taining of a considerable quantity of intelligence information, includ-
ing the identification of 700 members of both IRA factions and the
discovery of individual responsibility for about 85 previously unex-
plained criminal incidents."9 4
It is assumed that the source of this information was the United
Kingdom government, based on disclosures from the Northern Ire-
land security forces, but there are no means of verifying these claims.
It is also worth noting, as acknowledged by the Human Rights Com-
mission, that neither the security forces, nor the alleged victims of
abuse had given "accurate and complete accounts of what had hap-
pened."95 In addition, there were also problems, as acknowledged by
90. Rejali, supra note 11. The 1983 CIA manual refers to the Algiers conflict thus:
"During the battle of Algiers, the French army used torture to neutralize a terrorist group
within a matter of months. Unfortunately, along with the hundreds of terrorists that were
arrested and tortured, so were hundreds of innocent civilians." HusIAN RESOURCE Ex-
PLOITATION TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 59, § A-i, at pt. I.B.
91. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 59, para. 96
(1978).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 79-80, para. 167.
94. Id. at 60, para. 98.
95. Id. at 58, para. 93. Where there was dispute, the court relied on medical evidence.
Id. It is worth pointing out that state authorities and some detainees may have self-serving
reasons to lie regarding coercive interrogation. An al-Qaeda training manual seized during
a raid by police in Manchester, England advises members to make allegations of abuse: "1.
At the beginning of the trial, once more the brothers must insist on proving that torture
was inflicted on them by State Security [investigators] before the judge. 2. Complain [to
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the court, of people being "arrested or even detained on the basis of
inadequate or inaccurate information."96 This obviously raises the
problem of reliability-one cannot gain valuable information from
those unconnected to terrorism. Nor, given the lack of transparency,
can we judge the general effectiveness of the five techniques. For ex-
ample, did a small number of individuals subjected to the techniques
disclose a lot of information or were the disclosures more widely
spread? Were there any false confessions? Did the detainees give false
information? Indeed, we do not know how much information would
have been disclosed by utilizing lawful techniques. It is also worth not-
ing that whatever information was gleaned from the interrogations in
Northern Ireland, it did not reduce the amount or severity of terror-
ism. On the contrary, the court recognized the security situation wors-
ened significantly during this period. 97
The Algiers and Northern Ireland examples illustrate another
problem with coercion, it can easily distract from other more effective
techniques. Rejali argues that in the context of Algiers, torture be-
came so entrenched that "engaging in torture prevented the use of
ordinary-and more effective-policing skills."98 In a recent interview
for the New Yorker, a former member of the British security service
M15, Tom Parker, notes that in the context of Northern Ireland, often
"detainees aren't valuable" because they do not have the information
the interrogators are seeking. What is instead required is "'being crea-
tive' about human intelligence gathering, such as infiltration and
eavesdropping. "99
H. Underlying Reasons for the General Ineffectiveness of
Coercive Interrogation
A. The Problem of the Slippery Slope
The proponents of a legalized system of coercion claim that there
is no evidence of slippage in the use of coercive interrogation. Accord-
ing to Bagaric and Clarke, such an argument "holds that while torture
the court] of mistreatment while in prison." http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ter-
rorism/alqaida manual/ (last visitedJan. 29, 2005). The lack of transparency that attaches
to claims made by state authorities, also applies to some of the allegations made by detain-
ees. Often allegations of abuse have not been independently verified and it might be the
case that some detainees have reason to exaggerate or lie about their experiences.
96. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 38 (1978).
97. See, e.g., id. at 39-43.
98. Rejali, supra note 11.
99. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 116.
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might be justified in the extreme cases, legalizing it in these circum-
stances will invariably lead to torture in other less desperate situa-
tions." 100 This issue of slippage is important because it bears directly
upon the effectiveness of coercion. Coercion will have no beneficial
effect if, for example, it is used against people who do not possess life-
saving information or where increasingly coercive and ineffective co-
ercive techniques are utilized.
Posner and Vermeule give various examples of the slippery slope
argument, including, "Police who justifiably use coercive interroga-
tion in one setting-the prevention of catastrophic terrorist attacks-
will start using it to extract information or even confessions from petty
criminals and even innocent bystanders who are thought to be with-
holding information about a crime that they have witnessed." Posner
and Vermeule claim such arguments are "not supported by evi-
dence." 10 1 Bagaric and Clarke claim that the slippery slope argument
is "not sound" because the "floodgates are already open" and that "the
legalization of torture in very rare circumstances would, in fact, re-
duce the instances of torture because of the increased level of ac-
countability."'1 2 They also claim "there is no evidence to suggest that
the lawful violation of fundamental human interests will necessarily
lead to a violation of fundamental rights where the pre-conditions for
the activity are clearly delineated and controlled." 10 3
Whatever the current incidence of torture and ill-treatment
around the world, Bagaric and Clarke do not appear concerned that a
legal-based system of coercion might actually encourage coercion
rather than reduce it. Contemplating a system that is "clearly deline-
ated and controlled" assumes that such a system could be successfully
operated. It is apparent that in countries where attempts were made
to control coercion, they failed in the face of organizational and oper-
ational pressures. 10 4 Indeed, slippage appears to be an inevitable part
of coercive interrogation. Amnesty International argues, "States that
100. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 615.
101. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 16-17; see also Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1,
at 615-16.
102. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 615.
103. Id. at 615-16.
104. It has been argued that the Israeli High Court of Justice decision referred to ear-
lier has operated to restrain the interrogation methods of the security services. John T.
Parry, Judicial Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 73, 138 n.292 (2002). Since the publication of Parry's article, however, it has been
claimed that interrogation practices have worsened and that Israeli legal system has failed
to deal properly with allegations of abuse. The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel
("PCATI") argues:
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use torture and ill-treatment use it broadly.... We have not found a
single state which tortures 'only once,' or only in a few extreme
cases." 1
05
In responding to these denials of a slippery slope and to link the
problem of slippage to the issue of effectiveness one has to examine
the current evidence. Contrary to Bagaric, Clarke, Posner, and
Vermeule's claims, there are in fact several examples of this problem.
In the context of the Israeli security forces' use of coercive interroga-
tions, it has been claimed by B'Tselem that coercive techniques have
been used against an increasing range of people and well beyond situ-
ations involving "ticking bombs."
In practice, not only was torture not limited to "persons who
planted ticking bombs," it was not even limited to persons sus-
pected of membership in terrorist organizations, or to persons sus-
pected of criminal offenses. The GSS regularly tortured political
activists of Islamic movements, students suspected of being pro-Is-
lamic, religious sages, sheiks and religious leaders, and persons ac-
tive in Islamic charitable organizations, the brothers and other
relatives of persons listed as "wanted" (in an attempt to obtain in-
formation about them), and Palestinians in professions liable to be
involved in preparing explosives[-]an almost infinite list. In a
number of cases, wives of detainees were arrested during their hus-
bands' detention, and the interrogators even ill-treated them to
further pressure their husbands. Also, GSS agents used torture to
recruit collaborators. 10 6
B'Tselem claims that most cases in which coercive methods have
been justified before the Israeli courts as involving the threat of a
The [Israeli High Court of Justice] today enables torture to take place as far as
possible in time and place from the discerning eyes of attorneys .... The State
Prosecutor's Office takes care, by relying on internal GSS investigations, to reject
every complaint of torture, and the Attorney General accepts unquestioningly,
without exception and wholesale the "ticking bomb" and "defense of necessity"
claims presented to him by the GSS.
PuB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., supra note 77, at 81; see also B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION,
supra note 48, at 37 (arguing that "the review mechanisms have failed almost completely to
question GSS methods"); Shatz, supra note 87 (concerning the French use of coercion in
Algiers).
105. Amnesty Int'l, Torture and Ill-Treatment: The Arguments, http://web.amnesty.
org/pages/stoptorture-arguments-eng (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
106. B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION, supra note 48, at 33. See Memorandum from [redacted]
to [redacted] (June 10, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/ released/
t26142616.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) (United States Government memorandum re-
garding "Report of Violations of Geneva Conventions and the International Laws of Land
Warfare"), for a similar example involving United States forces in Iraq, recently released
under the United States Freedom of Information Act.
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"ticking bomb" have proved "totally unsubstantiated." 10 7 It cites exam-
ples where the use of coercion against three detainees was justified on
the grounds that they possessed information that would prevent ter-
rorist attacks. In the case of one of these detainees, the authorities
claimed to have evidence from six witnesses to support the allegation
that a detainee was "active in a military organization." All three detain-
ees were subsequently released without charge.108 In addition,
" [F]rom a sample of 162 Palestinians tortured by the GSS about whom
complete details are available regarding their post-interrogation fate,
sixty-five were released without any proceedings having been initiated
against them and forty-one were placed in administrative detention.
Only fifty-six were indicted."10 9 B'Tselem also notes that some interro-
gations only occur during weekdays.110 "'Intensive interrogation,'
then, is rather peculiar. The lethal bomb ticks away during the week,
ceases, miraculously, on the weekend, and begins to tick again when
the interrogators return from their day of rest."1"1 Elsewhere it has
been claimed that with some detainees there are long delays between
arrest and questioning with the use of coercion, which raises questions
regarding the urgency of the threat that led to the arrest.1 12 Further,
regarding the violent shaking of detainees, B'tselem states that this
technique is
supposed to be used only in cases of extreme danger .... over the
past two years, GSS interrogators violently shook at least twenty-
four Palestinians. Of these, eleven were not indicted for any of-
fense and no legal proceedings were initiated. Nine others were
released after being detained or imprisoned for several months.
Two were sentenced to imprisonment exceeding one year, and in
two cases, the legal proceedings against them have not yet been
concluded.113
Further slippage occurs in the Israeli example in terms of the
numbers of detainees who are subject to coercive methods. B'Tselem
estimates that the vast majority of Palestinian detainees may have been
107. B'TSELEM, ROUTINE ToRTuRE: INTERROGATION METHODS OF THE GENERAL SECURITY
SERVICE 30 (1998) [hereinafter B'TSELEM, ROUTINE TORTURE].
108. Id. at 29-30.
109. B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION, supra note 48, at 32.
110. B'TSELEM, ROUTINE TORTURE, supra note 107, at 15-16.
111. Id. at 16.
112. PuB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., supra note 77, at 58 (noting that one de-
tainee was held at least eighteen days before his interrogation even began).
113. B'TSELEM, ROUTINE TORTURE, supra note 107, at 31. In another report B'Tselem
claims that: "[t]he late prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, stated that some 8000 Palestinians
had been 'shaken' prior to mid-1995." B'TSELEM, 1987-1997 A DECADE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 13 (1998).
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subjected to coercion.' 14 In addition, in its report on the treatment of
detainees between September 2001 and April 2003, the Public Com-
mittee Against Torture in Israel ("PCATI") noted a "rapid deteriora-
tion in the ethics of GSS interrogations."' 15 The report refers to a
decision of the Israeli High Court ofJustice ("HCJ"), which found that
the GSS did not have lawful authority to use techniques such as shak-
ing or stress positions, but that a necessity defense might be available
where such techniques were to be used in cases involving "ticking time
bombs" where "there exists a concrete level of imminent danger of
the explosion's occurrence." 1 6 PCATI states:
The achievements of the HCJ ruling of 1999 have been ground to
dust. The HCJ's attempt to allow torture "only" in extreme condi-
tions as the improvisation of an interrogator in an "isolated case"
that can be recognized as legal "only" retroactively, has failed com-
pletely. Today, dozens and maybe hundreds of Palestinian detain-
ees are tortured monthly, with torture and ill-treatment being the
rule, and what the HCJ termed "reasonable interrogation" being
the exception. 1" 7
Beyond the Israeli example, slippage is also evidenced in the
Bush Administration's "war on terror." Commenting on coercive in-
terrogation techniques authorized by the Bush Administration and
scandals such as Abu Ghraib, David Gottlieb states that "[o]nce these
powers were placed in the hands of poorly-trained reservists, they
morphed into something more sinister."'1 8 Indeed, the current allega-
tions surrounding detainee treatment in Guantinamo Bay, Iraq, and
Afghanistan strongly suggest that allowing coercion has led to even
more serious abuses. This is further evidenced by the testimony of a
former military interrogator, Chris Mackey, in Afghanistan. Mackey
recounts the pressures that can produce slippage:
When we arrived in Afghanistan, I had an unshakable conviction
that we should follow the rules to the letter: no physical touching,
no stress positions, no "dagger on the table" threats, and no depri-
vation of sleep . . . but I knew that it was possible to make bad
decisions in the heat of the moment, that it was easy for emotions
114. B'Tselem estimates that coercive techniques have been used against up to 85% of
detainees, with the General Security Service annually interrogating 1000-1500 Palestinians.
B'TSELEM, ROUTINE TORTURE, supra note 107, at 5.
115. PUB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., supra note 77, at 48.
116. HCJ 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel, [1999] IsrSC 53(4)
817, translated in 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1484, 1485-86, paras. 32, 34 (1999).
117. PUB. COMm. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., supra note 77, at 89.
118. David J. Gottlieb, How We Came to Torture, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 449, 455
(2005). Of course, it could be argued that what is required are better trained and more
experienced interrogators. The problem is that on the basis of many of the examples dis-
cussed in this Article, experience may not appear to reduce the incidence of abuse.
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to overwhelm good judgment. Following the rules to the letter was
the safe route. Even entertaining the idea of doing otherwise was
inviting "slippage."' 19
Mackey goes on to describe that he discovered that the "safe
route" governed by the Geneva Conventions "was ineffective," and he
attempted to "get around" rules against making physical threats and
using sleep disturbance or deprivation. 120 He also recounts how he
was encouraged by an intelligence sergeant to scare detainees and
how he began to use indirect threats of violence.' 2 1 While Mackey em-
phasized that the Geneva Conventions were a significant considera-
tion in limiting his treatment of detainees, he provided some evidence
of the pressures that lead to slippage. Other evidence produced by
organizations such as Human Rights Watch suggest that a wide variety
of coercive techniques have been used in Afghanistan, including beat-
ings and several fatalities, and that abuses have been "systematic." 12 2
Further, slippage can and does occur when coercion is used for
means other than for the purposes of intelligence gathering. Evidence
of this problem was recently provided by three serving members of the
United States military, who in disclosures to Human Rights Watch,
pointed to the "systematic" abuse of Iraqi detainees by United States
forces. The report notes that military intelligence officers encouraged
the abuse of detainees as part of the interrogation process.1 2 3 Never-
theless, even if one accepts such techniques as a legitimate means of
gaining intelligence, the use of coercion spread beyond intelligence
gathering. One sergeant of the 82nd Airborne Division reported that
detainees would be abused because "we would just get bored .... We
did that for amusement .... Everyone in camp knew if you wanted to
work out your frustration you show up at the [detainee] tent. In a way
it was sport.' 2 4
119. MACK<.EY & MILLER, supra note 52, at 285.
120. Id. at 285-86.
121. Id. at 286-89.
122. For details, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "ENDURING FREEDOM": ABUSES BY U.S.
FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN (2004); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMIC ABUSE OF AFGHAN PRISON-
ERS (2004).
123. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEADERSHIP FAILURE: FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS OF TORTURE OF
IRAQI DETAINEES BY THE U.S. ARMY'S 82ND AIRBORNE DISION 1-2, 12 (2005) [hereinafter
LEADERSHIP FAILURE].
124. Id. at 9, 11. Similarly, as a result of an Israeli security crackdown in 2002, Amnesty
International reported the use of physical abuse of detainees during interrogation and also
questioned the motives behind the treatment of thousands of detainees:
Most of those still in custody are held without charge or trial, often under admin-
istrative detention orders which may be renewed indefinitely. There is strong evi-
dence that the majority of those detained have been arbitrarily detained, and that
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One final example of slippage is worthy of mention. It is evident
that coercion is being used in some cases, not to gather information,
but to gain confessions. Confessions, such as the one made by the
British detainee at Guant~namo Bay discussed earlier, have little role
to play in gathering information that will prevent future terrorist
attacks. 125
The purpose of this discussion has been to link the slippery slope
argument, dismissed by Bagaric, Clarke, Posner, and Vermeule, to the
issue of the effectiveness of coercive interrogation. The evidence dis-
cussed here suggests that in the midst of conflicts with terrorists and
insurgents, attempts to control the use of coercion fail and the tech-
niques escalate, as do the range of persons subjected to those tech-
niques. This is directly linked to the issue of effectiveness because
intelligence gathering requires the use of interrogation techniques
that produce reliable information, along with the accurate identifica-
tion of those who possess relevant knowledge. The problem of slip-
page also creates difficulties in terms of predictability as non-coercive
interrogation is cast aside to be replaced by a range of coercive tech-
niques that have not been proven to be more effective. Indeed, as the
earlier analysis suggests, such techniques might actually have a range
of predictable consequences that hinder, rather than assist, intelli-
gence gathering.
B. The Difficulty in Correctly Identifying Terrorists or Those Who
Possess "Required Knowledge"
As already noted, a fundamental challenge with coercive interro-
gation is the need to correctly identify those who should be subject to
such methods. Bagaric and Clarke identify five variables that they
claim are "relevant in determining whether torture is permissible. '" 126
One of the variables is the "likelihood" of the detainee's guilt or pos-
session of relevant information. They admit that " [i] t will be rare that
conclusive proof is available that an individual does, in fact, possess
the required knowledge . . . [and] potential torturees will not have
been through a trial process in which their guilt has been estab-
thousands of Palestinians have been rounded up, humiliated, ill-treated and held
in poor conditions as a collective punishment for the attacks on Israelis by mem-
bers of Palestinian armed groups.
AMNESTY INT'L, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERJRTORIES: MASS DETENTION IN CRUEL, INHU-
MAN AND DEGRADING CONDITIONS 23 (2002).
125. See COMPOSITE STATEMENT, supra note 74 and accompanying text. In the context of
Israel, see PUB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., supra note 77, at 61, 69.
126. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 611-13.
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lished."'127 They claim that this is not a "decisive objection . . . to the
use of torture" because trials do "not seem to be a particularly effec-
tive process."'128 It is worth noting, of course, that Bagaric and Clarke
are prepared in this context to allow the infliction of "all forms of
harm" based on evidence standards that are significantly lower than
that required to convict people for the most minor criminal offenses.
Bagaric and Clarke's casual dismissal of basic evidentiary require-
ments increases the likelihood that some, perhaps even many, com-
pletely innocent people would be victims of their legalized system of
torture. This is a problem that is likely to be exacerbated in circum-
stances where it is believed that a terrorist attack is imminent and time
is of the essence. It is evident that where coercive interrogation has
been permitted, there are pressures to act against individuals without
guilt or knowledge being "patently obvious." 129 In addition, authori-
ties can, and do, make serious mistakes, as did the police recently in
London when they shot dead an innocent man wrongly believed to be
a terrorist suspect. 130 A mistake as to identity was also made during
investigations following the al Qaeda terrorist attacks in Madrid. 13 1 Jo-
seph and Smith note that "seemingly incontrovertible evidence can
prove to be false: for two weeks during investigations last year into the
Madrid train bombings, the FBI mistakenly thought it had found the
fingerprint of an American lawyer, Brandon Mayfield, on evidence
linked to the terrorists."' 32 Recent disclosures regarding the abuse of
127. Id. at 612.
128. Id. In doubting the efficacy of the normal trial process Bagaric and Clarke state
"research carried out in the United Kingdom for the Royal Commission on Criminal Jus-
tice suggests that up to eleven percent of people who plead guilty claim innocence." Id. at
613. This of course undermines their argument; if significant numbers of people are being
wrongly convicted of criminal offenses in criminal cases with a high standard of proof, how
many mistakes are going to be made in the context of a system that does not require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt?
129. Id. In the context of recent evidence on the abuse of Iraqi detainees by United
States forces it is evident that any detainee was a potential target for abuse and that it was
being used before detainees were even given the chance to talk. LEADER SHIP FAILURE, supra
note 123, at 11-12. Testimony from Palestinian detainees suggests a similar problem with
physical or psychological coercion being used as a first resort. See B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION,
supra note 48, at app. 1; PUB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., supra note 77, at 23-75;
B'TSELEM, ROUTINE TORTURE, supra note 107, at 13, 21, 25-33.
130. Jonathan Calvert & David Leppard, Police Shot Wrong Man, TIMES (London), July
24, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-20749-1706907,00.
html (last visited on Oct. 8, 2005).
131. Sarah Joseph & Marius Smith, Torture Is Inhuman, Illegal and Futile, AGE, May 18,
2005, available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/Torture-is-inhuman-illegal-
and-futile/2005/05/17/1116095958897.htm (last visited on Oct. 8, 2005).
132. Id.
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Iraqi detainees by United States forces suggest significant numbers of
detainees were not in fact insurgents or terrorists. In the Human
Rights Watch report discussed earlier, a sergeant recounted: "We were
told by [military intelligence] that these guys were bad, but they could
be wrong, sometimes they were wrong."1 3 3 He continues:
The point of [the coercion] was to get them ready for interroga-
tion. [The intelligence officer] said he wanted the [detainees] so
fatigued, so smoked, so demoralized that they want to cooperate.
But half of these guys got released because they didn't do nothing.
We sent them back to Fallujah. But if he's a good guy, you know,
now he's bad guy because of the way we treated him.1
3 4
It has become increasingly apparent that many individuals de-
tained by the United States as part of the "war on terror" have no
connection to terrorism and do not possess the specific knowledge
that is being sought. This is a result of a range of factors including the
selling of supposed "terrorists" to United States forces and the poor
quality assessment of individuals when they are first screened by inex-
perienced military intelligence officers.1 35 Indeed, early internal intel-
ligence assessments at Guantdnamo Bay suggested that fifty-nine
detainees (nearly 10% of the total number of detainees at the camp)
did not meet screening criteria for deciding which prisoners should
have been sent to Guantdnamo Bay. A report in the Los Angeles Times
claimed that an operational commander at Guantinamo Bay had
gone to Afghanistan and complained "that too many 'Mickey Mouse'
detainees were being sent to the already crowded facility." 13 6 In a re-
cent interview for CBS news, Sergeant Erik Saar, a United States Army
linguist who worked at Guantdnamo for three months, echoed these
problems.
Some of [the detainees] were conscripts who actually were forced
to fight for the Taliban, so actually had taken up arms against us,
133. LEADERSHIP FAILURE, supra note 123, at 10.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Rose, supra note 75, at 46-47; see also Associated Press, Gitmo Detainees Say They Were
Sold, May 31, 2005.
136. Greg Miller, Many Held at Guantanamo Not Likely Terrorists, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22,
2002, available at http://www.latimes.com/la-na-gitmo22dec22,0,2294365.story. A recent
Amnesty International report also notes that:
scores of people had been released from GuantAnamo without charge or trial.
They, too, had been labelled by the administration as "enemy combatants" and
"terrorists," On return to their countries, the vast majority have been released.
Their home governments evidently either believed that there was no evidence
against the detainees, or that any evidence was inadequate, unreliable or
inadmissible.
AMNESTY INT'L, GUANTANAMO AND BEYOND: THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF UNCHECKED EXEC-
UTIVE POWER 16 (2005).
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but had little or no choice in the matter .... Some of them were
individuals who were picked up by the Northern Alliance, and we
have no idea why they were there, and we didn't know exactly what
their connections were to terrorism.
13 7
This problem of misidentification has also been acknowledged in
the Israeli experience of coercive interrogation. In a newspaper inter-
view cited by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, a GSS
interrogator admitted, "To say that [shaking and beating] always suc-
ceeds?-it doesn't. I also had a case when we thought mistakenly that
someone was a bomb [sic], and only afterwards it became clear that
he was an activist, but not related to that specific terrorist attack."'138
The coercive interrogation of those who are not guilty of wrong-
doing is one of the starkest illustrations of why coercion is inherently
problematic. The infliction of serious harm, or even death, as sug-
gested by Bagaric and Clarke, on the innocent significantly raises the
cost of a legally-sanctioned system of coercion. Based on past experi-
ence, prohibitions or restrictions placed on particular methods of co-
ercion or the circumstances in which those methods are to be used,
do not provide much of a guarantee that they will not be transgressed.
Indeed, the recent decision of the Bush Administration to exclude
"unlawful combatants" from the legal protections offered by the Ge-
neva Conventions has led to confusion amongst military personnel
and the systematic undermining of guidance that was given.' 39 This
has resulted in torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and also the
abuse of detainees, irrespective of their guilt. It cannot be assumed,
however, that the problem of slippage can be explained merely by the
absence of clear legal rules, and therefore could be more easily con-
trolled within a legal framework. The Israeli experience suggests that
legal rules may fail to operate as a control on coercive interrogation
where there is an unwillingness to enforce or be restrained by those
rules. 140
Conclusion
One might be forgiven for wanting to avoid any discussion of co-
ercive interrogation, its regulation, circumstances where it might be
viewed as morally or legally permissible, or, as in the case here, detail-
137. CBS News, Torture, Cover Up at Gitmo?, CBS NEWS.cOM, May 1, 2005, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/04/28/60minutes/main691602-page2.shtml; see
also RoSE, supra note 75, at 46-47.
138. PUB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., supra note 77, at 48.
139. See LEADERSHIP FAILURE, supra note 123, at 19-21, 25-26.
140. See discussion supra note 104.
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ing why it would often appear ineffective. At times the tone and form
of the recent debate over coercive interrogation has gone beyond rea-
soned discussion. The response to Bagaric and Clarke's defense of tor-
ture has been highly critical, which, given the nature of their
proposals, one would expect-not so, the hate mail received by
them.141 Alan Dershowitz has complained about the repeated misrep-
resentation of his views, as well as some of the personal characteriza-
tions to which he has been subjected. 142 In this vein, Professor Conor
Gearty recently authored a stinging attack on those he terms "Rum-
sfeldians," who, in his view, are attempting to normalize the use of
torture.143 The tone and content of his article personalizes the issues
and includes sweeping assertions regarding the views of those with
whom he disagrees. 1 44
The questionable tone of some of the commentaries in this area
also extends to those who challenge the critics of coercion. Louis
Michael Seidman recently characterized academics as having "little
desire to talk seriously about torture," and accuses some of evasion in
failing to deal with the "hardest issues.' 4 5 Those whom he terms
141. Geoff Maslen, Make Torture Legal, Say Law Academics, TIMES, May 27, 2005 (refer-
ring to criticism of Bagaric and Clarke's viewpoint by former Australian Prime Minister
Malcolm Fraser, and hate mail received by Bagaric and Clarke).
142. Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 275, 275-76 (2004).
143. Conor Gearty, Legitimising Torture-With a Little Help, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Jan.
2005, available at http://www.indexonline.org/en/news/articles/2005/ 1/international-
legitimising-torture-with-a-li.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
144. Id. As an illustration of the tone of his piece, Gearty states:
These individuals are distinguished by their determination to permit, indeed to
encourage, the holding of suspected "terrorists" or "unlawful combatants" (or
whoever it might be: "bogus asylum-seekers", "drug-barons", "anti-social elements"
etc) in conditions which make torture, inhuman and degrading treatment well-
nigh situationally inevitable. No ethic drives their policy, not even one of self or
national interest, since torture is inefficient as well as (in post-post-modern terms)
plain wrong. The brutality to which they commit themselves is that of the stupid
playground bully, lashing out just because it is possible; or that of the self-serving
police officer using violence to camouflage incompetence .... Through being
able to do this without immediate disgrace, they push back the barriers of the
unsayable, thereby opening the door to the hitherto undoable. To succeed in
transforming the liberal discourse, however, [they] need a great trauma on which
to feed; 11 September is an obvious example though not in itself sufficient. They
also require an ideological super-structure that fits with the democratic times in
which they still (perhaps reluctantly) find themselves.
Id.
145. Louis Michael Seidman, Torture's Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 881, 882-83 (2005).
Posner and Vermeule explore reasons as to why many people regard coercive interroga-
tion as a taboo. For example, they speculate that it might in part result from of "concern
for reputation, social influences, and the fear of ostracism," along with people "herding"
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"Moralists," he claims, "focus on the human suffering imposed by the
use of certain techniques, but are unwilling to broaden their concern
to suffering that might be caused by the failure to use them. Instead,
many of them adopt as an article of faith the proposition that these
techniques are never useful." 146 He also accuses "Moralists" of "willful
blindness" involving a "readiness to substitute pious denunciation for
practical measures that might limit the amount and severity of tor-
ture."147 He continues, "It should come as no surprise that people are
most comfortable with a stance of moral purity when they do not have
to pay the price.' 48
It could be argued that any discussion concerning the effective-
ness of coercive interrogation raises the possibility of lending support
for its use if coercive interrogation is found to be effective. This fear of
coercion becoming legitimized is undoubtedly guiding some of those
concerned with the current debate on coercive interrogation. Effec-
tiveness, however, cannot be examined in isolation. Even if coercion
does produce predictable and reliable results, it is only one of many
practical, legal, and ethical issues that require consideration, includ-
ing whether or not coercive interrogation can be controlled within a
framework of law. As such, it is important to engage in debate with
those who claim coercion is effective and who propose exceptions to
the current outright legal prohibition on the use of coercion.
The debate has already begun; the case for the use of coercion is
being made with increasing frequency, and it is important that those
opposed to the use of coercion have the confidence in their argu-
ments to engage in that debate. The last word on this issue should be
given to Alan Dershowitz, who reminds academics of their societal
role. He notes that there are dangers in discussing coercion as it
might legitimize its use, but points out that "academics have a duty to
raise [controversial issues] and submit them to the marketplace of
ideas. There may be danger in open discussion, but there is far
greater danger in actions based on secret discussion, or no discussion
at all."149
where people simply follow the views of others. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 33. A
troubling aspect of this analysis, along with that of Seidman is an underlining assumption
that if people think seriously about coercion, they will view its use more favorably.
146. Seidman, supra note 145, at 883.
147. Id. at 883-85.
148. Id. at 891.
149. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 163. In the context of "legitimizing" torture, I
have experienced concern from those who oppose the use of coercive interrogation. I
recently spoke at a conference that examined policing and intelligence issues since 9/11 at
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In a recent article, Harold H. Koh stated, "To be sure, there is
abundant evidence that torture is not effective either as an interroga-
tion tactic or as an information-extracting device.' 5 0 If this were true,
then answering the question set out in the title of this Article would be
straightforward. Unfortunately for the proponents and opponents of
coercive interrogation, effectiveness is a far more complex affair than
has often been acknowledged. The fact is that coercion does some-
times work in individual cases, 151 but a significant body of evidence
raises serious doubts about its overall reliability and predictability. Giv-
ing coercive interrogation a veneer of credibility by integrating it
within a regulatory framework, as suggested by Bagaric and Clarke,
will do nothing to address many of the problems discussed in this
Article.
This is an instance when the carefully crafted intellectual de-
fenses of coercive interrogation meet the realities of law enforcement,
the abuse of state power, and the pressures that are generated in times
of national emergency. More fundamentally, it is an instance when
these defenses meet the evidence on effectiveness. Bagaric and
Clarke's claim that coercion is an "excellent means of gathering infor-
mation" simply cannot be supported in view of the available evidence.
The word "excellent" surely implies that coercion will result in timely,
accurate disclosures in a clear majority of cases in which it is used.
Their single example of the successful use of coercive interrogation
does not remotely support the claim to which it is attached. Posner
and Vermeule's assertion that "the evidence" contradicts claims that
which I presented a version of this Article. Philip N.S. Rumney, The Effectiveness of Coer-
cive Interrogation, Remarks at the In the Shadow of 9/11 Conference at the University of
Wolverhampton (Sept. 22, 2005). During the question and answer session following my
paper it was evident that some of those attending the event were unhappy at the idea of
even discussing the effectiveness of coercive interrogation. I was told by two delegates that
there was a danger that I might "legitimize" the use of torture and that such discussions
could lead to a "slippery slope" where torture might become viewed as acceptable. During
the lunch interval another delegate asked me whether there were any British academics
arguing for the use of torture, and when I replied that I was not aware of any, he anxiously
sought my agreement that this was, indeed, a "good thing."
150. Harold H. Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COL.J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 641, 653 (2005).
151. This conclusion is based on Bagaric and Clarke's reference to the German hos-
tage case, Bagaric & Clark, supra note 1, at 589; note 26 and accompanying text, and an
assumption that, despite the lack of transparency, there is some factual basis to the claims
made by the Israeli and Northern Ireland security forces that were discussed earlier. To be
clear, there is no independent verification of these claims, however, they cannot be dis-
missed in their entirety without good reason. See also Confessions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist,
TIME, Sept. 15, 2002, at 35, 37. (discussing how after three months of "psychological inter-
rogation," including sleep deprivation and isolation, a leading member of al-Qaeda dis-
closed valuable intelligence to the CIA).
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coercion is ineffective, "runs aground" because, like the other propo-
nents, they cite so little reliable evidence to support their claim and
do not consider countervailing findings. Dershowitz's argument that
coercive interrogation "sometimes" works leaves a huge scope for
residual failure and can hardly be viewed as a solid basis for making
resilient legal and public policy. Indeed, if coercive interrogation is
largely ineffective, then the other arguments in favor of its use are
futile-who but a sadist would propose to legalize the infliction of
great harm with little prospect of any resulting benefit? This is why the
issue of effectiveness is central to the whole debate on the legalization
of coercive interrogation, and it is a matter with which its proponents
and opponents must engage.
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